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It is well documented that earnings inequalities have risen in many
high-income countries. Less clear are the linkages between rising
income inequality and workplace dynamics, how within- and
between-workplace inequality varies across countries, and to
what extent these inequalities are moderated by national labor
market institutions. In order to describe changes in the initial be-
tween- and within-firm market income distribution we analyze
administrative records for 2,000,000,000+ job years nested within
50,000,000+ workplace years for 14 high-income countries in North
America, Scandinavia, Continental and Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and East Asia. We find that countries vary a great deal in
their levels and trends in earnings inequality but that the
between-workplace share of wage inequality is growing in almost
all countries examined and is in no country declining. We also find
that earnings inequalities and the share of between-workplace
inequalities are lower and grew less strongly in countries with
stronger institutional employment protections and rose faster
when these labor market protections weakened. Our findings sug-
gest that firm-level restructuring and increasing wage inequalities
between workplaces are more central contributors to rising in-
come inequality than previously recognized.
inequality | workplaces | administrative data | earnings | institutions
Rising income inequalities are increasingly recognized as social,political, moral, and macroeconomic problems for high-income
nations (e.g., refs. 1–3). Using linked employer–employee (LEE)
administrative data for 14 countries (Canada, Czechia, Denmark,
France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States) we
describe changes in the initial market income distribution produced
by workplaces over roughly the last quarter century. Almost all
rising wage inequalities in the United States are between firms (4),
with the increased market power of super star firms (5) and out-
sourcing and subcontracting of production to low-wage employers
(6) as the two most plausible mechanisms. We explore the global
extent of this trend and the degree to which it is moderated by
national labor market institutions.
Although most wages come from employers, most prior re-
search on earnings inequalities rely on self-reported earnings
from surveys of individuals (e.g., ref. 7). Increasingly, social sci-
entists have been able to access and develop administrative data
collected from employers by national governments, typically as
part of their tax and social welfare systems. These data often
have nearly complete, highly accurate information on individual
earnings, making it possible to examine the job-level (per-
son–employer match) wage distribution, changes in that distri-
bution, and their association with organizational characteristics.
LEE data allow us to locate inequalities in the firms that produce
them. An analytic focus on employers is crucial if countries are to
develop labor market or industrial policies that focus on the
quality of jobs.
In some influential accounts rising inequality is treated as
ubiquitous and almost inevitably increasing across high-income
capitalist nations (e.g., ref. 3). Others have pointed out that there
is considerable national variation in low-wage work, as well as
earnings inequality levels and trends (e.g., refs. 8 and 9). The
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former stress institutional similarities among capitalist countries
and the centripetal forces of globalization and technological
change, both of which are understood to reduce the demand for
routine production roles. The latter stress national variation in
institutions that reduce employee’s dependence on employers,
provide various forms of job security, and put a floor under
wages, all of which reduce the possible levels of wage inequalities
associated with employee bargaining power. Although both
perspectives emphasize the relative bargaining power of em-
ployers and employees, neither has typically had access to LEE
wage data.
Early LEE studies found for multiple countries that within-
workplace wage variance tended to be substantially higher than
between-workplace inequalities (10). In contrast, recent studies
have shown that most of the rising inequality in the United States
(4, 11), West Germany (12), and Sweden (13) has been produced
by rising between-workplace (Sweden and Germany) or firm
(United States) inequality.
Rising between-workplace inequality occurs when workplaces
become more dissimilar in their average pay. This can be pro-
duced by some firms becoming more powerful in their market
positions and so accumulating larger shares of national (or
global) income. Examples of these organizational dynamics in-
clude the rise of superstar firms, such as the global dominance of
a few technology firms such as Microsoft, Apple, Facebook,
Google, and Amazon (5), and the power of financial service
firms in some countries to accumulate national and global in-
come (14, 15). Akerman (16) suggests that this process leads to
the concentration of more educated workers in higher-wage
firms and the less educated in lower-wage firms.
Between-firm earnings polarization can also be propelled by
the reconfiguring of organizational boundaries in which firms
with market or organizational power specialize in high value-
added work and outsource or subcontract routine production.
Examples of such organizational reconfigurations include dom-
inant brand manufacturers spinning off supplier functions to
lower-wage firms (17), unionized workers being replaced by in-
dependent contractors (18), branded companies subcontracting
out both production and capital investment while absorbing the
profits associated with the brand (6), and global commodity
chains in which routine production are sourced from low-wage
locales by large retailers or manufacturers in high-income
countries (19). Outsourcing of low-skill jobs from high-wage
firms has been linked to earnings declines in the range of 10 to
15% in Germany and 4 to 24% in the United States (20, 21).
This package of dynamic shifts in the power, productivity,
boundaries, and global scope of dominant firms appears to have
been encouraged in some countries by the contemporary policy
model of reduced government regulation and employment pro-
tections (22), as well as by the reconfiguration of large firms as
more narrowly responsible to shareholders rather than other
stakeholders, such as employees, communities, customers, and
even their nation of origin (23).
Our analyses document substantial variation between coun-
tries in inequality trends. Total inequality is rising in nine
countries, declining in three, and stagnant in two. Most strik-
ingly, we find in 12 of the 14 countries examined that the orga-
nizational structure of production is shifting toward increasing
between-workplace wage dispersion. In all of those 12 countries
this process is more pronounced in the private sector, but we also
find rising between-workplace inequality in the public sector in
eight countries. Finally, we show that trends in rising between-
workplace wage dispersion are closely aligned with declining
national labor market institutions, institutions that in some
countries once protected the bargaining power of employees
relative to employers.
In what follows we first establish country variation in the levels
and trends in earnings inequalities for all job–person matches
and for subsamples of full-time job–person spells. We then de-
compose each country’s inequality levels and trends into be-
tween- and within-workplace variance components. Next, we
compare levels and trends in the proportion of inequality at-
tributable to the between-workplace component across countries
in terms of their shifting labor market institutions. We then
discuss results, followed by a presentation of Materials and
Methods. The paper is followed by SI Appendix, organized as five
appendices.
Results
We present results for both the levels and trends in total and
between-workplace earnings inequality as well as the proportion
of total inequality that is between workplaces. There is sub-
stantial variation across countries in both the levels and trends in
total inequality. In contrast, between-workplace inequality is
rising in 10 countries. Additionally, because in some countries
the within-workplace inequality component falls, the proportion
of inequality that is between firms is rising in 12 of 14 countries.
Trends in Total Inequality. Fig. 1 presents trends in the total vari-
ance in logged earnings and the between-workplace variance
estimates for all jobs for 14 countries. There are striking dis-
parities in the levels of inequalities, with the United States,
Canada, and Israel more and the Nordic countries less unequal
in their initial market distribution of income.
Rising wage inequality is not an international constant. There
is substantial variation across countries, with strong growth rates
between the first and last observation in Czechia (+26.0%),
Germany (+62.6%), Korea (+35.0%), Norway (+43.6%), and
Sweden (+32.0%); slower growth rates in Denmark (+8.5%),
Israel (+8%), the Netherlands (+8%), and the United States
(+10.8%); declines in France (−21.7%), Hungary (−4.5%), and
Slovenia (−11.5%); and relatively stable distributions in Canada
and Japan. There is also a tendency in several countries, most
notably Germany and Slovenia, for inequality declines after the
great recession of 2008 to 2010.
In five of the countries examined, job-level wage inequalities
are either roughly stable or falling. Trends for full-time jobs
largely mirror those of the entire economy for every country,
with only minor discrepancies (see SI Appendix, Appendix 2, for
full-time estimates).
Trends in Between-Workplace Inequality. Variance in between-
workplace wage inequalities for all jobs are rising absolutely in
10 of 14 countries. At the high end, Germany has experienced a
92.5% growth in between-workplace inequality. Other countries
range between a growth rate of 66.5% (Sweden) and 7.9% (Ja-
pan). Countries which have seen absolute declines in between-
workplace inequality are France (−11.6%), Slovenia (−14.9%),
and Hungary (−3.9%). Canada has experienced essentially
no change.
Initially, the proportion (rather than the level) of between-
workplace inequality ranges from a low of 18.5% in the Neth-
erlands to over 50% in Germany, Hungary, and Japan. Canada
and Denmark show relatively low initial between-establishment
inequality shares (SI Appendix, Appendix 2, and Table S1.4).
Czechia, Israel, Korea, Norway, France, Slovenia, Sweden, and
the United States are sandwiched in the middle of these distri-
butions. By the end of the period in seven countries (Czechia,
Israel, Japan, Hungary, Germany, Norway, and South Korea),
half or more of their total wage variance is produced by between-
workplace wage dispersion.
Fig. 2 provides the trends in the proportion of inequality at-
tributable to the between-workplace component for the total
economy, as well as for the private and public sectors. The
proportion of total inequality attributable to the between-
workplace component has grown in every country except
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Hungary and Canada. Between-workplace wage dispersion oc-
curs even in countries which have very high initial proportions.
Germany and Japan’s between-workplace inequality proportion
grew from 55.9 to 66.2% and 52.4 to 58.0%, respectively. Cze-
chia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden all show the largest
increases in the between-workplace component, growing by 9%
or more. Denmark, France, Israel, Norway, South Korea, and
the United States all experienced growth of 5% or more in the
between-workplace inequality component. Although between-
workplace inequality declined over Slovenia’s entire economy,
their private sector experienced a rise in between-workplace in-
equality of about 2.5%.
The between-workplace component in both Canada and
Hungary, on the other hand, has remained stable overall. Im-
portantly, not a single country experienced a decline in either the
level or proportion of the between-workplace component of in-
equality. Wage inequality dynamics in the last 2 decades have
been driven increasingly by the relative importance of between-
workplace earnings dispersion in most countries examined.
If between-workplace earnings dispersion is driven primarily
by market pressures, it should be confined largely to the private
sector. On the other hand, if public sectors are responding to
institutional pressures to look more like the private sector, we
might find that this pattern happens there as well. In all coun-
tries, between-workplace dispersion is larger in the private sector
than in the public sector. For six of these countries, between-
workplace wage dispersion has also grown at a faster rate in the
private sector. In 8 of the 14 countries, dispersion is occurring in
the public sector as well. Only in Hungary and Slovenia do we
observe declines in the between-workplace component in the
public sector (around 5% for both countries).
Institutional Variation. Much prior research has shown that wage
inequalities and particularly the prevalence of low wages tend to
be lower in countries with national or industrial institutions that
increase the bargaining power of employees relative to em-
ployers (e.g., refs. 24 and 25). We ranked each country in terms
of six labor market institutional protections: the centralization of
collective bargaining units and worker’s councils; the level at
which businesses, labor, and government engage in wage co-
ordination (national, industry, workplace, and individual); the
proportion of the economy that is affected by corporatist ar-
rangements, such as industry-wide wage bargaining; the per-
centage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements;
regular contract individual’s legal employment protections; and
Fig. 1. National trends in the total variance of log wages (Left) and between-workplace variance for all jobs (Right). USA-Song denotes Song et al. (4)
estimates, which span 1993 to 2013. USA-Census denotes estimate from the US Census, which begin in 2005 and end in 2013. South Korea’s estimates are
limited to full-time jobs only, and 2005 estimates are missing.
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. PNAS Latest Articles | 3 of 7
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temporary contract individual’s legal employment protections
(see SI Appendix, SI Appendix 3, for full details).
Fig. 3 shows trends in institutional protections for each
country, as well as trends in the between-workplace share of total
wage inequality. At the beginning of our period, the countries
fell into three distinct institutional groupings: The United States
and Canada both had very low scores, reflecting an almost total
absence of institutional employment protections. These two
countries also remain stably low through our time period. The
next set of countries, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Slovenia, the
Netherlands, France, and Denmark, all began with quite high
institutional employment protections. Of these, Germany, Swe-
den, and Norway all experienced strong declines. France, the
Netherlands, and Denmark maintained their robust institutional
labor market protections. Slovenia’s protections collapsed in the
early 1990s, only to be built back up to their former strength by
the early 2000s. Czechia, Hungary, Israel, South Korea, and
Japan start in between the extremes of the two former groups.
Fig. 2. The proportion of total inequality that is between firms for the total (Left), private (Middle), and public sectors (Right). Estimates are for all jobs
except for South Korea, which are full-time jobs only. Japan, South Korea, and USA-Song only have private sector estimates. South Korea is missing for 2005.
Fig. 3. The relationship between institutional employment protections and the between-workplace component. All estimates are on all job samples, except
for South Korea, which is full-time jobs only. US (4), Japanese, and South Korean estimates are private sector only and missing for 2005.
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Czechia and Japan both remain relatively stable, whereas Hun-
gary steadily increased the strength of its institutional protec-
tions, and Israel and South Korea weakened theirs.
Fig. 3 displays a general pattern of association between shifts
in institutional protections and changes in the between-
workplace inequality share. When labor market institutions
weaken, between-workplace inequalities tend to rise. In Den-
mark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and South Korea, when labor market institutions
weakened, workplace inequalities rose. In Canada and the
United States where institutions remain stably weak, we see little
change. Institutional protections strengthen in Czechia, Hungary,
and Slovenia. In Hungary the between-workplace share of in-
equality is flat; in Slovenia it declined overall but grew in the
private sector. Czechia is the anomaly, with a strong rise in
between-workplace inequality despite strengthening labor market
institutions.
To more formally investigate this process, we estimated a se-
ries of error correction statistical models to explore the potential
impact of institutional change on rising within- and between-
workplace inequalities. The first stage of the error correction
model takes the following form:
ΔYt = α0 + αc + α1Yt−1 + β0ΔXt−(t−1) + β1Xt−1 + «t.
The model estimates the impact of levels and change in
institutional protections on change in inequality, controlling for
both the lagged value of inequality and a country fixed effect to
absorb stable unobserved country attributes. See ref. 26 for more
information.
From the first stage model we can directly estimate the short-
term coefficient and SE of ΔX (institutional change). In a second
stage, the long run effect of institutional change is calculated as
β1Xt-1 divided by the error correction rate (α1Yt-1). We then use
the Bewley model (27) to estimate the SE of the long-run effect
of X. Code for these estimations is provided in SI Appendix,
Appendix 5.
To rule out the most prominent alternative explanations we
control for changes in unemployment, labor force participation,
and female labor share. We do not have country year measures
of concentrated economic power, and so our models remain
vulnerable to omitted variable bias. The ability of powerful firms
to outsource production is likely to be restricted when countries
have strong labor market institutions. The focus on logged
earnings and models that include lagged dependent variables and
country fixed effects, as well as jackknife estimations to rule out
influential case explanations, increase confidence that our esti-
mates are likely to be reasonable, if not definitive.
We hypothesize that declining institutional protections will be
associated with a rising proportion of between-workplace in-
equality. We also estimate models of the total, between, and
within inequality components. None of these models are strictly
speaking causal models as we think that the mechanisms that
produce rising between-workplace inequality are primarily or-
ganizational. Rather, shifts in institutional protections are indi-
cators of an economic environment that is more or less
conducive to organizational strategies of outsourcing, franchis-
ing, subcontracting, and the like, as well as more individual and
firm-level wage bargaining.
Table 1 reports the results. In no case do we see instantaneous
inequality responses, which rules out the interpretation that
rising between-firm inequality encourages declining institutional
protections. We do see long-term shifts in inequalities accom-
panying changes in institutional labor market protections in all
models. Rising proportions of country between-workplace in-
equalities respond most strongly to declining institutional pro-
tections, and this result is on average stronger in the private
sector than in the public sector. In response to declining
employment protections, between-workplace variance in in-
equality rises in both the private and public sectors. The same is
true for within-workplace inequalities, although the estimated
effect sizes are relatively weaker, as is model fit.
Discussion
Market wage inequalities are not rising in all countries. The
pattern of rising between-workplace wage dispersion, however,
is more ubiquitous. In 12 of 14 countries examined, between-
workplace inequalities are rising in the private sector. In eight
this pattern is also present in the public sector. No country shows
a clear decline in the between-workplace proportion of wage
inequality.
Institutions that support the bargaining power of labor and the
employment security of individuals strongly condition the levels
of potential inequality both between and within firms. These
institutions include collective bargaining through labor unions,
national-level wage bargains, high minimum wages, the existence
and power of worker’s councils in the workplace, and employee
protections from dismissals. The United States and Canada
stand out for their low levels of employment protection and high
levels of wage inequalities. However, even in the United States,
there is evidence from the 1970s, prior to the 1980s collapse of
unionization, that collective bargaining was associated with lower
between-workplace inequality (28). The erosion of institutional
protections in multiple countries appears to have given individ-
ual firms greater leeway to engage in organizational practices
which generate increased wage inequalities, presumably via such
mechanisms as outsourcing, franchising, independent contrac-
tors, and labor subcontracting, all of which decouple less pow-
erful workers from dominant firm production and silence their
potential claims on the lead firm’s income.
Prominent research on Germany suggests that weakening la-
bor market institutions and union bargaining power are linked to
rising between-workplace inequalities (12). Other research has
found that when institutional protections weaken, organized la-
bor is less able to extend protection to low-skilled workers,
leaving those workers increasingly vulnerable to outsourcing and
independent contracting (29–31). It is the linkage between these
institutional processes and rising between-firm inequality that we
have the strongest confirmatory evidence. We strongly suspect
that weak or declining institutional employment protections in-
crease high-wage firms’ incentive to restructure production via
outsourcing and other forms of externalized production. Con-
versely, weak institutional protections enable the creation of low-
wage firms to absorb this work. Doellgast (30), for example,
shows that declining union power in the German telecommuni-
cations industry facilitates labor outsourcing. Similarly, Weil (6)
for the United States stresses the absence of union and other
employment protections for the outsourcing of production and
risk to dependent supplier firms.
We do not observe rising firm market power in this paper.
There is evidence elsewhere of rising product market concen-
tration in our study period in Europe, the United States, and
Japan (5, 32, 33). The rising market power of firms has been
found to raise wages in those firms (5, 14, 15). We suspect that
this market power also makes it easier for those firms to source
or outsource risk and production to dependent supplier and
franchisee firms (6, 19). There is good evidence for the United
States, at least, that the concentration of revenue in the largest
firms has increased even as employment has shrunk (34). It is
also possible that these and other market processes have led to a
rising economic return to educated labor (16). Other research
has suggested that sectoral and industrial change, which is clearly
implicated by the outsourcing mechanism, may also be important
drivers of between-country inequality trajectories (35).
This paper has not adjudicated between these various mech-
anisms but has shown that rising between-workplace inequality is
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. PNAS Latest Articles | 5 of 7
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widespread. We look forward to the next round of research to
unpack the (likely) nationally contingent impact of institutional,
firm market power, and business strategy mechanisms.
Our results suggest that policies aimed at reducing rising in-
equalities in national production systems might focus on
between-firm and workplace inequalities via mechanisms that
strengthen the bargaining power of employees and address the
ability of powerful firms to outsource risk while absorbing rev-
enue. Strengthening institutional protections for lower-skilled
workers will not only improve their wages and job security but
also reduce the ability of more powerful firms to outsource pro-
duction to lower-wage firms. Policies to limit the market power of
dominant firms may moderate both the earnings going to the top of
those firms and their ability to externalize labor costs.
Materials and Methods
Data Availability. Source data for this paper are highly confidential and
available only under license from the country of origin. We provide coun-
try–year aggregate data for all data points discussed in the paper in SI Ap-
pendix, Appendices 2 and 3.
Data Harmonization. We endeavored to harmonize all measurement and
sampling decisions, excepting only the definition of full, part-time, and
marginal job wage; in those cases, national definitions were given priority. SI
Appendix, Appendix 1, details country-specific sampling, operationalizations
of all variables, and the consequences of sample restrictions for final sample
size and describes country-specific variation in sample coverage.
In all analyses we exclude marginal jobs with very low wages, individuals
below age 16, and workplaces with only one employee after the prior two
exclusions.
Samples. For Canada, Denmark, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States we have population or near-
population administrative data covering nearly all workplaces and nearly
all employees. In Czechia, Germany, Japan, and Korea we analyze very large
random samples of workplaces and their employees. In Hungary we have a
random sample of 50% of all employees with firm identifiers.
Japan and South Korea only have private-sector estimates available. The
other 12 countries have both public and private sector estimates. We begin
in the early 1990s because that is when most national economies began to
generate LEE data. More detail on country-specific data descriptions can be
found in SI Appendix, Appendix 1.
In all countries we excluded jobs with earnings so low that they might
represent reporting error or extremely short job spells. In the United States,
Canada, and Israel these were done with income cutoffs and produced
substantial exclusions, presumably of short-duration job spells. In the other
countries, low-income cutoffs were also used, but these identified very few
marginal jobs, which we suspect represent employer reporting error (SI
Appendix, Appendix 1).
In all countries, informal economic activity is not captured.
We use two sets of estimates for the United States. Estimates provided by
Song et al. (4) range from 1993 to 2013 and include only the private sector.
We supplement the Song et al. estimates with estimates provided by J.K.
while employed by the US Census Bureau. These Census Bureau estimates
cover only 2005 to 2013 but provide information on both the private and
public sectors, as well as estimates for the subset of full-time jobs.
Statistical Significance. Because we have population data or very large
samples we do not test for statistical significance in our trend analyses. Our
smallest country–year sample is for Korea in 2003 with 362,789 jobs and
52,085 workplaces. We do test for statistical significance in country–year
models that examine the relationship between changes in labor market
institutions and inequality components. We provide the statistical code used
to produce these estimates in SI Appendix, Appendix 5.
Units of Observation.Our core observational units are jobswithin establishments.
A job is a person–workplace match in a specific year. We focus on all jobs, which
includes part-time and part-year job spells, as well as the subsample of full-time
only jobs. Our focus on jobs highlights the output of the economy in terms of the
employment opportunities that individuals and households confront.
Job Earnings Measurement. All earnings data are based on personnel records
and reported by employers and so have very little measurement error. Our
preferred earnings concept is logged hourly earnings. We include all earnings
associated with a job spell including regular, overtime, and bonus earnings.
In nine countries we observe hourly earnings. For Germany and Hungary
we observe daily earnings. In the United States, Canada, and Israel we observe
yearly earnings associated with a job spell and have no information on hours
or days worked. For these countries we use low wage cutoffs to define both
marginal and full-time jobs (see SI Appendix, Appendix 4, for more detail). In
these three countries we cannot clearly distinguish between jobs that are
not full-time including both year-long part-time, low-earning part-year jobs,
and some combinations of the two. For these countries we ran robustness
checks for different definitions of marginal jobs and trends for total in-
equality and between and within components were very similar.
Organizational Units. For 12 countries we observe establishments, that is,
actual workplaces. In Canada we use firm within state as a proxy for es-
tablishment. In the United States we use simply firm identifiers as our data
lack state-identifying information. For those countries for which we have
both firm and establishment identifiers, we are able to show that estab-
lishment and firm-level estimates track quite closely, and the inequality
trends of the countries do not differ substantively between establishment
and firm organizational concepts.
Table 1. Error correction times series estimates regressing change in inequality on lagged inequality, lagged institutional protections,
and changes in institutional protections
Short-term impact of institutional
protections
Long-term impact of
institutional protections
P value: long-term
impact
Model fit
(adj. r2)
Country
years
Proportion of total inequality
between workplaces
All sectors −0.032 (0.039) −0.071 (0.014) 0.000 0.732 162
Private sector −0.044 (0.043) −0.104 (0.012) 0.000 0.739 161
Public sector 0.015 (0.039) −0.069 (0.023) 0.014 0.490 117
Between-workplace variance
All sectors −0.021 (0.019) −0.182 (0.009) 0.000 0.881 162
Private sector −0.023 (0.024) −0.195 (0.009) 0.000 0.868 161
Public sector −0.005 (0.013) −0.129 (0.009) 0.000 0.810 117
Within-workplace variance
All sectors 0.001 (0.018) −0.068 (0.009) 0.000 0.736 162
Private sector 0.005 (0.020) −0.061 (0.009) 0.000 0.738 161
Public Sector 0.013 (0.031) −0.059 (0.012) 0.001 0.514 117
Table reports coefficients, with SEs in parentheses. The institutional scale is available until 2010, and so our analyses begin with the first observation for a
country and end in 2010. Israel was not included because of missing information on employment protection legislation. For all sectors and private sector
estimations, Song et al. (4) estimates were used; for public sector models, US Census estimates were used. All models control for yearly unemployment rates
and labor force participation and are robust to additional statistical control for changes in female labor force participation as well as jackknife estimations.
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Earnings Inequality Measurement. We measure earnings inequality as the
variance in logged wages, computed as σ2 = (∑(Χ − μ)2=Ν), where σ2 is the
variance, Χ is the observed logged wage for each job match, μ is the mean
logged wage for all job matches, and Ν is the total number of job matches.
The variance in log wage is scale invariant, directly decomposable into
component parts, and particularly sensitive to income transfers lower in the
income distribution (36). Thus, it is particularly useful for comparisons across
time and countries, can be directly decomposed into between- and within-
firm components, and is most appropriate when the normative concern is
the social welfare of those with less income (37, 38, 39).
We follow Lazear and Shaw (10) in decomposing the logged earnings
variance into within-workplace and between-workplace inequality with the
following formula:
σ2 =∑
J
j=1
pjσ
2
j +∑
J
j=1
pj(wj −   w . )2   ,
where pj is the share of workers in the economy who are working in firm j, σ2j
is the variance of wages in firm j, wj is the mean wage for firm j (across its
workers), and w is the mean wage for the entire economy across its workers
and firms (ref. 10, pp. 7–8).
Because wages in all countries are right skewed, with more people below
the mean than above, variance measures are particularly sensitive to the
levels and shifts in inequality among the majority of working people who
earn less than or near to their country’s mean wage. Most social welfare and
labor market policies are focused on this population of earners. Our analyses
do not inform debates about earnings trends for top earners, CEOs, or movie
or sporting stars.
Institutional Protection Measure. Prior research in industrial relations (22) and
comparative political economy (8) have stressed the importance when
explaining national variation in employment outcomes to focus on the
packages of policy configurations that employers and employees confront.
We follow this practice, measuring the strength of national institutional
employment protections with a six-item scale. The first indicator is collective
bargaining coverage [taken from the Database on Institutional Character-
istics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts
(40)]. Collective bargaining coverage measures the percentage of all workers
under a collective bargaining contract and functions as a measure of union
bargaining strength across the national economy. The next two components
of the scale both concern the levels of legal protection employees have from
collective or individual dismissals. One concerns employees working “regu-
lar” contracts, the second temporary employees. These are primarily indi-
cators of individual bargaining power and job security. The final three items
come from Jahn’s corporatism scale (41) which includes indicators of the or-
ganizational structure and power of collective bargaining groups and worker’s
councils, the functional level at which the government engages in wage co-
ordination with interest groups, and the level (cross-industry, sectoral, and firm)
of wage bargaining. We weight each of the six items equally in a standardized
scale. All of the items are strongly positively correlatedwith each other, and the
scale Cronbach alpha is 0.892. The items are described in depth, and their values
for each country year can be found in SI Appendix, Appendix 3.
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